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We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their 
motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can 
exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms 
employing cooperative workers make strictly positive profits. Profit differences across firms 
persist because cooperation strictly increases output and worker separation requires firms 
employing cooperative workers to pay out weakly lower wages. 
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Recent evidence (see G¨ achter (2006) for an overview) suggests that humans
diﬀer in their motivation to cooperate in teams. Two subgroups represent
the largest share of the population: selﬁsh types who exhibit a propensity to
shirk and free-ride, and conditional cooperators who reveal a preference to
cooperate conditional on the cooperation of others. We analyze the interac-
tion of these types in a competitive labor market where worker cooperation
is essential for a ﬁrm to produce output. While ﬁrms in our model cannot
induce selﬁsh workers to cooperate without making losses, conditionally
cooperative workers might cooperate in teams if matched with workers of
their own type. Types are private information.
We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which selﬁsh
and conditionally cooperative workers self-select into diﬀerent ﬁrms and
conditionally cooperative workers cooperate. In this equilibrium selﬁsh
workers do not want to inﬁltrate cooperative ﬁrms as the latter pay out
lower wages. Conditionally cooperative workers accept low wages since they
can thus ensure to be matched with other workers of their own type. This
allows them to receive their full intrinsic beneﬁt from mutual cooperation.
Cooperative ﬁrms proﬁt from worker self-selection in two ways. First,
output is higher due to worker cooperation; second, wages are lower due to
screening. In consequence, cooperative ﬁrms sustain strictly larger proﬁts
in a separating equilibrium than ﬁrms employing selﬁsh workers.
Our results oﬀer a possible explanation for persistent proﬁt diﬀerences
across ﬁrms based on worker self-selection and team productivity. The per-
sistence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns has been documented in various industries
(Waring 1996). Evidence on human resource management practices shows
that team work and cooperation among employees can greatly improve
production eﬃciency (Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997, Hamilton,
Nickerson, and Owan 2003). But team production does not work equally
well within all ﬁrms and teams. In line with recent experimental evidence
(G¨ achter and Th¨ oni 2005) we argue that ﬁrms want to attract condition-
ally cooperative workers to implement sustainable worker cooperation. Our
model then demonstrates that the positive eﬀects of team work can survive
labor market competition and that ﬁrms may generate additional returns
as screening entails cooperative workers accepting lower wages. The re-
sulting worker separation is consistent with ﬁeld evidence demonstrating a
strong link between worker motivation and labor market outcomes (Car-
penter and Seki 2005).
Intuitively, the persistence of proﬁt diﬀerences in our model is caused
1by a combination of moral hazard and adverse selection. Suppose, for
example, that worker cooperation was only a problem of moral hazard.
All ﬁrms could then achieve the same levels of cooperation and proﬁts
by choosing optimal incentives. If cooperation requires workers with spe-
cial attributes, cooperation can vary across ﬁrms as those employing non-
cooperative types might be unable to induce cooperation. Yet if types are
observable, ﬁrms can shut out non-cooperative workers and competition
for cooperative types drives down proﬁts to zero.1 In our model, condi-
tional cooperators are more productive than selﬁsh workers only if they
are matched with other workers of their own type. This particular comple-
mentarity, together with asymmetric information, allows cooperative ﬁrms
to keep parts of their proﬁts in equilibrium.
The present model extends Kosfeld and von Siemens (2007). While
both models study the self-selection of workers diﬀering in their motivation
to cooperate, Kosfeld and von Siemens (2007) focus on the relationship
between individual performance incentives and cooperation assuming that
ﬁrms cannot provide monetary team incentives. The present paper allows
ﬁrms to use team incentives.
2 Model
There is a countably inﬁnite number of workers with total mass normalized
to one. Workers who are employed by the same ﬁrm are matched into
teams of two. Each team member i contributes binary eﬀort ei ∈ {0,1}
to team production. Team output is stochastic with the team being either
successful or not. If the team is successful, generated output is G > 0 per
worker; otherwise, output is zero. The success probability π depends on
the sum of workers’ eﬀort contributions where π(2) > π(1) > π(0) > 0. We
assume that eﬀort choices are non-contractible and that ﬁrms can condition
wages on team output only. A contract w = (f,b,n) then consists of a ﬁxed
wage f ∈ IR+ and a bonus b ∈ IR agents receive if and only if their team
is successful. To make the analysis interesting we assume that total wages
must be positive, thereby generating a problem of moral hazard within
ﬁrms. Contracts include the ﬁrm’s identity n ∈ IN as workers might have
distinct preferences over ﬁrms that oﬀer the same ﬁxed wage and bonus.
Assuming that the number of ﬁrms is countably inﬁnite let W = IR2
+ ×IN
denote the contract space.
1The same result holds true if types are private information (e.g., Delfgaauw and Dur
forthcoming, von Siemens 2006).
2Firms sell output at a price of one. Given contract w = (f,b,n) and
workers’ eﬀort choices (ei,ej) let
π(ei + e2)G − [f + π(ei + e2)b] (1)
be a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt per worker generated by a team. Firms can hire
any number of teams oﬀering a single contract to all its teams maximizing
expected proﬁt per team.2
Our key assumption is that workers diﬀer in their willingness to con-
tribute team eﬀort. There are two types: each worker is either selﬁsh or
conditionally cooperative. Selﬁsh workers never exert costly eﬀort unless
they face suﬃciently strong monetary incentives. Conditionally cooper-
ative workers do not only respond to monetary incentives but get some
additional beneﬁt from contributing to the team if their team colleague
contributes team eﬀort, as well. Let θ ∈ {c,s} denote a worker’s type.
Once matched into a team with contract w, the expected utility of worker i
being of type θ, choosing eﬀort ei, and being matched with worker j who
exerts eﬀort ej is deﬁned as
uθ(w,ei,ej) =

f + π(ei + ej)b − c(ei) if θ = s,
f + π(ei + ej)b − c(ei) + γ(ei,ej) if θ = c.
(2)
Worker i enjoys expected utility f+π(ei+ej)b from his wage. Exerting
eﬀort causes him eﬀort costs c(ei). We normalize c(0) to zero and assume
that c(1) = C > 0. Conditionally cooperative workers additionally enjoy
intrinsic satisfaction γ(ei,ej) from mutual cooperation.3 To capture the
conditional aspect of cooperation we set γ equal to some positive constant
Γ if and only if both workers contribute team eﬀort and normalize γ to
zero otherwise. Workers’ types are private information; yet, it is common
knowledge that types are independently distributed with each worker being
conditionally cooperative with prior probability λ ∈]0,1[.
We make the following assumptions regarding the eﬃciency of team
eﬀort. Let ∆¯ π = π(2)−π(1) and ∆π = π(1)−π(0). First, we assume that
2The precise sequence of actions in our model is as follows. Firms simultaneously enter
the market at zero costs by oﬀering a contract to workers. Workers simultaneously choose
among all contracts oﬀered. Depending on their choice, they enter a ﬁrm and are matched
into teams of two. In case a worker rejects all oﬀered contracts or remains unmatched,
he earns an outside-option utility normalized to zero. Finally, workers produce output
by simultaneously exerting eﬀort and payoﬀs are realized.
3Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) provide empirical evidence for the assump-
tion that some workers receive non-pecuniary beneﬁts from team cooperation.
3C > max{∆¯ π G,∆π G}. Limited liability then implies that it is impossible
for a ﬁrm to provide selﬁsh workers with monetary incentives to exert high
team eﬀort without making losses.4 Second, we assume that C < ∆¯ π G+Γ.
Thus, exerting team eﬀort is eﬃcient for conditionally cooperative workers
when taking their intrinsic beneﬁt from cooperation into account.
We consider symmetric equilibria in which all workers share identical
equilibrium strategies. In the following, we can thus suppress indexation for
workers’ identities. A worker’s strategy comprises his contract acceptance
choice where aθ(w,W) ∈ [0,1] is the probability for a type-θ worker to
accept contract w out of a set W of oﬀered contracts. It also speciﬁes
his eﬀort choice where eθ(w,W) ∈ {0,1} is the eﬀort of a type-θ worker
who accepts contract w from a set W of oﬀered contracts. Since workers
can condition their contract choices upon their type, workers and ﬁrms
rationally update their beliefs after observing workers’ contract choices.
Let µ(θ|w,W) ∈ [0,1] be the probability for ﬁrms and workers to believe
a worker to be of type θ if the latter accepts contract w out of a set of
oﬀered contracts W.
We deﬁne a competitive equilibrium as follows. With regard to workers,
we assume that equilibrium strategies and beliefs form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium given all possible sets of oﬀered contracts. With regard to
ﬁrms, we follow Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) so that a competitive equi-
librium is a ﬁnite set W ∗ of oﬀered contracts satisfying the following re-
quirements given workers’ equilibrium behavior. First, the equilibrium set
of contracts contains no irrelevant contracts that are never accepted in
equilibrium. Second, no ﬁrm oﬀers a contract yielding expected losses in
equilibrium. Third, no ﬁrm can enter the market by oﬀering a new contract
that attracts workers and yields strictly positive expected proﬁts per team.
Let u∗
θ be the equilibrium utility of workers of type θ.
Whether contracts form a competitive equilibrium depends on workers’
reaction towards a new contract. This reaction in turn depends on workers’
beliefs upon accepting the new contract, on the Bayesian equilibria they
expect to be played within ﬁrms, and on whether they expect other workers
to also accept this contract so that teams can be formed. To sharpen
results we employ equilibrium reﬁnements.5 These reﬁnements impose the
following intuitive restrictions. First, suppose a ﬁrm enters the market with
4 Our results are not aﬀected if team eﬀort is eﬃcient but due to a minimum wage
law the ﬁxed wage must be so high so that ﬁrms cannot use monetary incentives to
implement high team eﬀort from selﬁsh workers without making losses.
5None of the reﬁnements is needed for our main result, i.e., the existence of a sepa-
rating equilibrium with cooperation and persistent proﬁt diﬀerences.
4a contract that is not accepted by any worker. We then require that workers
do not re-coordinate their behavior and choose the same acceptance and
eﬀort decisions as if the new contract had not been oﬀered at all.6 Second,
in the spirit of Cho and Kreps (1987) workers do not believe that a worker
who accepts a new contract can be of some type if this type always gets
strictly less than what he can get by keeping to his equilibrium behavior
while the other type might get weakly more. Third, suppose a newly
oﬀered contract might only be accepted by a certain type, but that for this
type acceptance can only be rational if a unique Bayesian equilibrium is
played within the ﬁrm. We then require that workers coordinate on that
equilibrium. Finally, coordinated deviations might be needed to realize
potential utility gains because workers need other colleagues to be matched
into a team. We require that workers do not reject an oﬀered contract only
because they think they would be alone in the ﬁrm and thus cannot be
matched into a team. The formal deﬁnitions of these reﬁnements can be
found in the appendix.
3 Results
We ﬁrst intuitively describe workers’ equilibrium behavior within ﬁrms.
The simple formal arguments are left to the reader. By assumption ﬁrms
cannot induce selﬁsh workers to exert eﬀort without making losses. Since
ﬁrms do not make losses in a competitive equilibrium, there exist at most
two Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies within ﬁrms. There is always a
selﬁsh equilibrium in which all workers shirk. A conditionally cooperative
worker who unilaterally deviates cannot get the intrinsic beneﬁt from co-
operation and therefore optimally behaves as if he was selﬁsh. Yet, there
might also exist a cooperative equilibrium if the combined monetary and
intrinsic incentives are suﬃcient for conditionally cooperative workers to
exert eﬀort. In this equilibrium the conditionally cooperative workers work
whereas selﬁsh workers shirk. As C < ∆¯ π G+Γ, there exists a cooperative
equilibrium if a team consist only of conditional cooperators and the latter
receive all revenues.
Given our reﬁnements, we show below that ﬁrms use a “best separating
contract” in any separating equilibrium in which conditionally cooperative
workers cooperate. This contract speciﬁes a ﬁxed wage f and bonus b that
maximizes the utility of conditionally cooperative workers who exert eﬀort
6This reﬁnement is needed to meaningfully deﬁne the other reﬁnements.
5and are matched with other conditionally cooperative workers
π(2)b + f − C + Γ (3)
subject to the constraints
∆¯ π b + Γ − C ≥ 0 (4)






f,f + b ≥ 0. (7)
By (4) conditionally cooperative workers optimally exert eﬀort if
matched with other cooperating workers. This might require monetary
incentives in addition to the intrinsic beneﬁt from cooperation. Constraint
(5) ensures that selﬁsh workers do not want to accept a best separating con-
tract if they can get utility π(0)G elsewhere. By (6) ﬁrms oﬀering a best
separating contract make no losses. (7) is the limited liability constraint.
We get the following result.
Lemma 1 (Best separating contract). There exists a solution to maxi-
mization problem (3) to (7), if and only if




The unique best separating contract speciﬁes f = 0 and b = Gπ(0)/π(1).
Proof. We start by showing that any best separating contract sets a
ﬁxed wage of zero. To this end we must ﬁrst demonstrate that either the
incentive constraint for the conditionally cooperative workers (4) or the
screening constraint (5) must be binding at the optimum. Suppose both
(4) and (5) are not binding. Then optimal contracts maximize (3) given
(6) and (7). (6) must be binding as it is otherwise optimal to increase b.
From those contracts satisfying (6) with equality, the contract with b = G
and f = 0 minimizes the r.h.s. of (5). But even this contract violates (5).
At least one of the constraints (4) and (5) must thus be binding.
We can now show that any best separating contract sets a ﬁxed wage of
zero. Suppose that f > 0 holds at an optimum. Take changes db > 0 and
dw = −π(2)db. By construction, these contract changes have no eﬀect on
(3) or (6). Since db > 0 they increase the l.h.s. of (4) and thus slacken (4).
They also reduce the r.h.s. of (5) and thus slacken (5). At least one of these
constraints is binding at an optimum, which allows subsequent changes that
6strictly increase (3). Any solution to (3) to (7) must consequently specify
a ﬁxed wage of zero, f = 0.
We can next derive the condition for the existence of a best separating
contract. Constraint (4) sets a lower bound on the bonus that conditionally
cooperative workers must get if they are to exert eﬀort, while (5) sets an
upper bound on the bonus to ensure separation of both types of workers.
Given a ﬁxed wage of zero, both constraints are not mutually exclusive if
and only if (8) holds.
Finally, any solution to the above maximization problem must have the
following properties. Since f = 0, constraint (7) does not conﬂict with (3)
and can be ignored. Constraint (5) implies b ≤ Gπ(0)/π(1) < G so that
(6) can be ignored. The objective function and the l.h.s. of (4) are strictly
increasing in b. The binding (5) then yields b = Gπ(0)/π(1). 
Asymmetric information implies that the maximum expected wage that
can be paid out in a separating equilibrium without attracting selﬁsh work-
ers is limited. But since a high bonus might be needed to implement team
eﬀort, the incentive constraint (4) and the screening constraint (5) can be
in conﬂict. Only if the non-monetary beneﬁts from mutual cooperation
are suﬃciently high, then there are contracts that satisfy both constraints.
The following proposition shows that there exists a separating competitive
equilibrium in which conditionally cooperative workers cooperate and some
ﬁrms make strictly positive proﬁts.
Proposition 1 (Separating equilibrium). If and only if condition (8) holds,
there exists a separating competitive equilibrium in which conditionally co-
operative workers cooperate. In this equilibrium ﬁrms attracting selﬁsh
workers make zero expected proﬁts, while ﬁrms attracting conditionally co-
operative workers oﬀer best separating contracts and make strictly positive
expected proﬁts.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that condition (8) is necessary for the existence
of a separating equilibrium with cooperation. We start by showing that
since selﬁsh workers shirk in any equilibrium, u∗
s = π(0)G in any separating
equilibrium. First, u∗
s ≤ π(0)G as otherwise ﬁrms attracting selﬁsh workers
make losses. Second, u∗
s ≥ π(0)G as otherwise ﬁrms can enter the market
oﬀering f = 0 and b = G −  where  > 0 and π(0)b > u∗
s. This contract
makes strictly positive expected proﬁts if accepted. But not accepting
violates Reﬁnement 4 for selﬁsh workers. Thus there is market entry.
Given u∗
s = π(0)G, the contracts accepted by conditionally cooperative
workers must satisfy (4) to (7) in a separating equilibrium with cooperation.
7Constraints (4) and (5) are not mutually exclusive if and only if







As f ≥ 0 this condition can only be satisﬁed if (8) holds.
We next show that in any separating equilibrium with cooperation ﬁrms
attracting conditional cooperators oﬀer the best separating contract. If (8)
holds with equality, the best separating contract is the only contract that
satisﬁes (4) and (5). If (8) is slack, there exist other contracts that satisfy
(4) to (7) and we need to be more precise. Suppose cooperative workers
accept one of these other contracts in equilibrium. Then a ﬁrm can enter
the market oﬀering a contract w with f = 0 and b = (G−)π(0)/π(1) with
 > 0. Constraints (4) to (7) hold for small . Since the best separating
contract is the unique solution to program (3) to (7), π(2)b − C + Γ > u∗
c
for  suﬃciently small. Oﬀering w yields strictly positive proﬁts in case
of acceptance. Yet all workers rejecting it violates our reﬁnements: Since
 > 0 constraint (5) holds with strict inequality. Reﬁnement 1 thus implies
µ∗(s|w,W ∗ ∪ w) = 0. Conditionally cooperative and selﬁsh workers get
the same utility in a selﬁsh equilibrium. Reﬁnement 3 therefore implies
e∗
c(w,W ∗ ∪ w) = 1. Then for conditional cooperators not to accept w
violates Reﬁnement 4.
We ﬁnally show that a separating equilibrium exists if (8) holds. Given
the situation in Proposition 1 there cannot be proﬁtable market entry by
ﬁrms that attract only selﬁsh types. Equally, there cannot be proﬁtable
market entry by ﬁrms that attract only conditional cooperators. Suppose
thus that a ﬁrm enters the market with a pooling contract w. To complete
the proof we only have to show that we can then specify equilibrium worker
behavior that does not violate our reﬁnements while contract w either
attracts no workers or makes losses.
Before specifying workers equilibrium behavior note that u∗
c > u∗
s in
any separating equilibrium with cooperation, and that Reﬁnement 2 does
not restrict beliefs as by deﬁnition both types of workers might be attracted
by w. We now set e∗
θ(w,W ∗ ∪ w) = 0 for θ ∈ {c,s}. Since both types get
the same utility in a selﬁsh equilibrium, they get the same deviation utility
uθ(w,0,0) = ˆ u when accepting w.
There are three cases. First, suppose ˆ u > u∗
c > u∗
s. Reﬁnement 4 then
implies a∗
θ(w,W ∗ ∪ w) = 1 for θ ∈ {c,s} so that µ∗(c|w,W ∗ ∪ w) = λ.
As workers are attracted even when expecting the selﬁsh equilibrium to
be played, coordinating on the selﬁsh equilibrium does not violate Reﬁne-
ment 3. But then w must make losses as otherwise ˆ u ≤ u∗
s. Second,
8suppose u∗
c ≥ ˆ u > u∗
s. Reﬁnement 4 yields a∗
s(w,W ∗ ∪ w) = 1 but setting
a∗
c(w,W ∗∪w) = 0 causes no violation. This implies µ∗(c|w,W ∗∪w) = 0.
Given this belief the selﬁsh equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. Reﬁne-
ment 3 thus has no bite and workers coordinate on the selﬁsh equilibrium.
Then w must make losses as otherwise ˆ u ≤ u∗
s. Third, suppose u∗
c > u∗
s ≥
ˆ u. Without violating Reﬁnement 4 we can set a∗
θ(w,W ∗ ∪ w) = 0 for
θ ∈ {c,s}. Beliefs are not pinned down so that µ∗(c|w,W ∗ ∪ w) = 0
is possible. Given this belief the selﬁsh equilibrium is the unique equilib-
rium. Acceptance choices are optimal so that the ﬁrm cannot attract any
workers. 
In order to ensure separation, the screening constraint (5) sets an upper
bound on wages that are paid out in cooperative ﬁrms. This implies that
ﬁrms oﬀering a best separating contract make strictly positive proﬁts in
equilibrium. Market entry and competition do not erode these proﬁts for
the following reason. If a new ﬁrm (or a selﬁsh ﬁrm) mimics an existing
cooperative ﬁrm, it does not oﬀer conditionally cooperative workers more
than what they currently earn. It is thus optimal for these workers to
remain at their current employer. However, if ﬁrms oﬀer higher wages than
the best separating contract, the screening constraint (5) is violated and
it draws all selﬁsh workers. In this case conditionally cooperative workers
cannot be attracted as they would then loose their intrinsic beneﬁt from
mutual cooperation.
Appendix: Reﬁnements
Reﬁnement 1 (No Re-Coordination). Let W ∗ and ˜ w 6∈ W∗ with a∗
θ(˜ w,
W ∗ ∪ ˜ w) = 0 for θ ∈ {c,s}. Then a∗
θ(w,W ∗ ∪ ˜ w) = a∗
θ(w,W ∗) and
e∗
θ(w,W ∗ ∪ ˜ w) = e∗
θ(w,W ∗) for θ ∈ {c,s} and all w ∈ W ∗.
Reﬁnement 2 (Reasonable Beliefs). Let W ∗ and ˜ w 6∈ W∗ with a∗
θ(˜ w,
W ∗ ∪ ˜ w) = 0 for θ ∈ {c,s}. Suppose u∗
θ > uθ(˜ w,e, ˜ e) for all (e, ˜ e) but
uθ0(˜ w,e, ˜ e) ≥ u∗
θ0 for some (e, ˜ e) with θ 6= θ0. Then µ∗(θ| ˜ w,W ∗ ∪ ˜ w) = 0.
Reﬁnement 3 (Coordination Eﬀort). Let W ∗ and ˜ w 6∈ W∗ with a∗
θ(˜ w,
W ∗ ∪ ˜ w) = 0 for θ ∈ {c,s}. Suppose µ∗(θ0|˜ w,W ∗ ∪ ˜ w) = 1 for some θ0 ∈
{c,s}. If there exists a unique equilibrium eﬀort ˜ e such that uθ0(˜ w, ˜ e, ˜ e) ≥
u∗
θ0, then e∗
θ0(˜ w,W ∗ ∪ ˜ w) = ˜ e
Reﬁnement 4 (Coordination Acceptance). Let W ∗ and ˜ w 6∈ W∗ with
a∗






θ(˜ w,W ∗ ∪
˜ w),e∗
θ0(˜ w,W ∗ ∪ ˜ w)

for θ ∈ {c,s}.
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